



# FOREIGN POLICY bulletin

AN ANALYSIS OF CURRENT INTERNATIONAL EVENTS

VOLUME 38 NUMBER 5

## Arab Nationalism and Nasser

by George Kirk

Arab nationalism is as old as Islam itself. In Islam God finally revealed Himself to men through the Arabic language, and the Arabs' speedy conquest of a great empire seemed the outward sign of divine favor. In later centuries this sense of being a chosen people had to be shared with the whole supranational community of Islam, and so it remained until modern times. Almost all the Muslim Arabs within the Ottoman Empire regarded that empire as continuing to typify the divinely ordained supremacy of Islam.

The Young Turk revolution of 1908 awakened hopes of reform, but instead of fulfilling these hopes, the Young Turks sought to impose a narrowly Turkish nationalism throughout the empire. Consequently some Muslim Arabs were thrown into association with Arabic-speaking Christians who had been acquiring the Western 19th-century concept of secular nationalism. Modern Arab nationalism is the offspring of this marriage of ideas.

The nationalists, however, were still a small minority. Their limited contribution to the overthrow of the Ottoman Empire in World War I did not, in the eyes of the world statesmen who made the peace in 1919, give their

political ambitions an automatic priority over the ambitions of Britain, France and the Zionists in the Middle East for which historic justification was also claimed. During the subsequent 30 years of struggle the Arab nationalists, using both diplomacy and force, gained ground, but they still remained short of their goal.

By 1946 seven Arab states—Egypt, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Yemen—had achieved independence and had formed a loose association in the Arab League. This, however, was far from satisfying the intellectuals' desire for Arab unity. In 1947 the Palestine issue afforded an occasion for demonstrating that unity in action. At that time the Arab governments and peoples resolved to defy the United Nations and forcibly prevent the establishment of the state of Israel. In this undertaking they failed. Although official apologists sought excuses in the undoubtedly partiality toward Israel shown by the UN majority and in the destructive rivalries between Arab governments, the more honest Arab critics were left with the bitter conviction of failure both in leadership and self-discipline.

NOVEMBER 15, 1958

FOREIGN POLICY ASSOCIATION INCORPORATED  
345 EAST 46TH STREET • NEW YORK 17, NEW YORK

PRODUCED BY UINZ.ORG  
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The reforms attempted in Egypt by Naguib and Nasser after the military coup of 1952 that ousted King Farouk evoked the spontaneous approval of nationalists in the neighboring Arab countries. But although Egypt had from the outset played the leading role in the Arab League, an Egyptian nationalism focused on the Nile Valley was of longer standing and of more immediate appeal to most Egyptians than the wider nationalism of the Arab League. During their first two years in power Egypt's young and inexperienced military rulers concentrated their efforts on immediate problems in Egypt and the Sudan. Their main concern outside seemed to insure that no Arab state should diverge from Egypt in its foreign policy.

By the end of 1954 Gamal Abdel Nasser had become the unrivaled leader of the new Egypt. His book, *Egypt's Liberation: The Philosophy of the Revolution*, suggests that he might, in any case, have aspired to a wider Arab leadership once the British had agreed to terminate their hold on the Suez Canal. As events turned out, however, challenges which the Egyptian military regime encountered in the winter of 1954-55, on both domestic and international fronts, caused it to repair its shaken prestige by recourse to the emotional appeal of pan-Arab nationalism. The action which finally assured the nationalists' support of Nasser was his 1955 arms deal with the U.S.S.R. At last Arab nationalism had found a great power which, it thought, would help it to achieve

independence and unity. In the Arabs' view Britain had "betrayed" the Arabs after World War I; Nazi Germany had encouraged Arab extremists in World War II and had then failed them. By contrast, the U.S.S.R. had an obvious interest in extruding the hostile West from the Middle East.

### Nasser's Prestige Triumphs

Since 1955 Nasser's policy has won him a series of prestige triumphs, especially with the middle-class youth of the Arab cities. To more experienced observers, however, it has also demonstrated Egypt's military weakness when tested, as well as its economic isolation and financial poverty amid the rising pressures imposed by its rapid population growth. The regime has been forced to put off its long-term schemes of economic and social improvement and to substitute short-term "shots" of nationalist prestige. The establishment of the United Arab Republic is the latest of these prestige injections, although the hangover phase of this cycle is already evident. The revolutionary schism of the Arab world between conservative and radical factions—a cleavage which coincides to some extent with the division between the older and younger age groups, as well as between privileged and nonprivileged—has been sharpened by the fact that the radicals, after many disappointments, have found their "charismatic leader." Meanwhile, however, the originally opportunist and maneuverable Egyptian dictatorship

seems to be becoming the prisoner of doctrinaire ideologies.

For the radical idealists of Arab countries, Arab political unity is, or should be, a natural consequence of the linguistic and cultural affinity of the Arab world, and any religious or social minorities—notably in Lebanon—which resist speedy unification are to be brought into line by subversion or force. These radicals, moreover, are probably ready to grasp the proffered aid of the U.S.S.R.—notably for financing the High Aswan Dam—more trustingly than is Nasser himself. Nasser is thus faced with the dilemma of either allowing himself to be swept by the popular tide of revolutionary nationalism into dangers—both intra-Arab and international—which in his moments of reflection he would rather bypass; or of putting on the brakes and thereby risking the alienation of the revolutionary elements who are his ardent vocal supporters now, but—as happened in Palestine in 1948 and in Sinai in 1956—would prove useless in a major crisis.

Nasser may still have some margin of choice left, but time is short. Meanwhile, the best-intentioned offers of Western cooperation for the economic development of the Middle East seem either premature or, at best, palliatives.

Professor Kirk has been connected with the Arab world in one role or another since 1935. Since 1957 he has been lecturer on the modern history and government of the Middle East at the Harvard University Center for Middle Eastern Studies.

(For another view of Nasser, see Richard D. Robinson, "What Is Nasser Like?" FOREIGN POLICY BULLETIN, October 15, 1958.)

Published twice a month by the FOREIGN POLICY ASSOCIATION, INC., 345 East 46th Street, New York 17, N.Y., U.S.A. EDITORIAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE: JOHN S. BADEAU • ROBERT R. BOWIE • BENJAMIN J. BUTTENWIESER • EDWIN F. CHINLUND • HENRY STEELE COMMAGER • BROOKS EMENY • WILLIAM P. GRAY • AUGUST HECKSCHER • HAROLD F. LINDER • MARGARET PARTON • STEPHEN H. STACKPOLE. • President, JOHN W. NASON • Editor, VERA MICHELES DEAN • Washington Contributor, NEAL STANFORD • Assistant Editor, GWEN CROWE. • The Foreign Policy Association contributes to the public understanding by presenting a cross-section of views on world affairs. The Association as an organization takes no position on international issues. Any opinions expressed in its publications are those of the authors. • Subscription Rates: \$4.00 a year; single copies 20 cents. RE-ENTERED AS SECOND-CLASS MATTER SEPTEMBER 26, 1951 AT THE POST OFFICE AT NEW YORK, N.Y., UNDER THE ACT OF MARCH 3, 1879. Please allow one month for change of address. Contents of this BULLETIN may be reproduced with credit to the Foreign Policy Association.



## Foreign Policy and the Election

Now that the 1958 congressional election is over, it is clear that in the United States it is impossible to keep foreign policy out of a political campaign. Yet both parties always pay lip service to the premise that a very strict set of Marquis of Queensberry rules must govern discussion of foreign policy in a campaign, no matter how low, wide and unhandsome the slugging on domestic issues becomes.

Vice President Richard M. Nixon charged the Democrats with being the "war party" and claimed that the GOP was a "peace party." Secretary of State John Foster Dulles on October 14 publicly rebuked the Vice President for what Mr. Dulles felt was overstepping the bounds of permissible foreign-policy debate, and the President backed him up the next day. But Mr. Nixon and other GOP leaders objected so firmly that not only did Mr. Dulles retract his words, but the President promptly wired Mr. Nixon to keep on punching.

The Democrats, for their part, from the start of the campaign, felt that GOP foreign policy was fair political game—particularly what they called Mr. Dulles' "brinkmanship" over the Chinese offshore islands. For refusing to "buy" the Administration's claim that Matsü and Quemoy were now a matter of American honor, Senator Theodore F. Green, chairman of the powerful and Democratic-controlled Senate Foreign Relations Committee, was publicly rebuked by the President. Subsequently Green rebuffed an effort by Mr. Dulles, on behalf of the Administration to make up—and a rift was thus left that could have serious repercussions in the future.

Of course, if there had been a real war going on, foreign policy would have been eliminated automatically as a campaign issue. But in this instance the Republicans demanded immunity from the kind of criticism to which they had subjected the Democrats in 1952, while claiming success for the Administration's offshore policy. This proved too much for the Democrats, who refused to let the Republicans have their victory—and silence too.

### Will Tumult Now Die?

But now that the shouting over foreign policy is over, will the tumult die? The assumption is—and so is the usual practice—that the non-bipartisanship toward foreign policy displayed during a political campaign will quietly pass into oblivion the day after election. This could be expected to happen again, if it were not for certain factors.

One of these factors is the President's personal involvement in the election feuding at a time when he needs to work closely and sympathetically with a Democratic Congress. Another is Mr. Dulles' support, however unwilling, of Mr. Nixon's violent attacks on the way the Democrats have handled foreign policy in the past.

A third is the rebuff of Senator Green, who is still smarting under the White House rebuke. The Senator may now no longer try to control the smoldering revolt of the other Democrats on his committee over Mr. Dulles' handling of foreign policy. It is no secret that Senators Fulbright, Humphrey, Morse, Sparkman, Kennedy and Mansfield are alarmed at Mr. Dulles' actions, in

disagreement with his Quemoy policy and suspicious of his one-man diplomatic probes and parries. They have not yet said outright "Dulles must go." But if the Democrats in Congress, and particularly the Democrats on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, let it be known privately that they cannot work with the Secretary of State for another two years, then the President may face the unhappy choice of either letting Mr. Dulles go or fighting the Senate Democrats on the one issue that is closest to his heart—international peace and cooperation.

There is enough truth in the statement on October 20 of Senator Lyndon B. Johnson that "no president in history has received such responsible backing from an opposition party on foreign policy issues" to give serious pause to the White House. The way Senator Johnson ran herd on the Senate Democrats during the last session of Congress is still a matter of wonderment and awe to observers here. If Senators Johnson and Green should together decide they have taken enough from the GOP and the White House, then the President and Mr. Dulles are in for trouble.

Fortunately for the country, the Democrats, however miffed they may be, have individually and collectively, as Senator Johnson pointed out, given wider and fuller support to the Administration's foreign policy (except on Matsü and Quemoy) than have their GOP colleagues—and this as a matter of conviction. However much they might be tempted to stage a foreign policy sit-down strike, they know they would thereby be spiting their own party.

NEAL STANFORD



## How to Check Communism

At a time when the United States is deeply concerned about the ultimate objectives of Chinese as well as Russian communism, and wonders whether Premier Khrushchev may prove right in asserting that communism will triumph over democracy, we may gain a sense of perspective by looking at the present state of communism in Europe.

It has often been assumed in the United States that Communist ideas, backed by the military might of the U.S.S.R. and, more recently, of Communist China, would enjoy lasting strength—at least as lasting as human institutions can be—and that therefore the non-Communist world must gird itself for a long struggle against communism with all the military as well as ideological weapons at its command. The widespread belief that communism was “inevitable” in many areas of the world gave intellectual support to the thesis of historical inevitability propounded by the Marxists.

The fear among non-Communists aroused by this belief seems to have been confirmed by events of the past 40 years. After World War I communism gained ground in several countries of Europe—Germany, France and Italy—although even then it did not prove a match for the forces of Nazism and fascism which, like communism, had been inspired by the disillusionments, frustrations and miseries of the interwar years.

World War II, in which Russia, invaded by Germany in 1941, found itself fighting the same enemy as the Western democracies, brought an extension of Soviet rule to Eastern Europe, from the Baltic to the Black Sea. Meanwhile, Japan's conquests in

China and Southeast Asia had shattered the prestige and influence of the West in former colonial territories, several of which, upon attaining independence, were confronted with the threat of communism at home. And in 1949 the Communists gained power in mainland China. Thus during the past 13 years 750 million people were brought under Communist rule in Europe and Asia.

### Communist Recession

Yet when communism seemed to be at the peak of its influence, a process of erosion began to be evident. This process was due in part to developments in the Communist world which weakened the hold of Communist ideology on men and women outside the Iron Curtain who had not been true believers but had voted Communist in protest against what they regarded as errors or evils of non-Communist societies. Among these developments were Marshal Tito's rebellion against Stalin in 1948; Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalin after the dictator's death in 1953; the changes that subsequently took place in Poland; the revolts in East Germany and, most of all, in Hungary; the Boris Pasternak case; and the ruthless measures taken by the Chinese Communists following the failure of the “100 flowers” campaign—most recently the creation of agricultural communes which spell the elimination of the family and a regimentation unknown in Russia even in the darkest days of Stalin's rule.

However, disenchantment with Russian communism and interest in the new alternative offered by Titoism (in spite of Milovan Djilas' at-

tack on the “new class”) are only part of the story. For meanwhile admiration for Russia's industrial achievements, as distinguished from its ideology, worked to the advantage of Moscow in the world-wide propaganda battle. What turned the tide against communism in Europe was not only the negative reaction toward Russia's actions in Hungary, but the positive steps that have been taken to meet the demands for far-reaching reforms, hitherto unsatisfied, which had kept pro-Communist sentiment alive. In this endeavor the European countries have been greatly helped by the financial aid and the technical experience of the United States.

### Reform the Antidote

Many had believed for years that the most effective remedies against communism were either the overthrow of existing Communist regimes through war or revolution, or the outlawing of local Communist parties—neither of which was guaranteed to end existing discontents. Yet it had long been clear that in politically stable and economically healthy societies communism had difficulties in gaining a foothold—as witness Britain and the Scandinavian nations, or West Germany where even the postwar influx of 10 million refugees did not bring about political unrest. More recently, Italy and France have demonstrated that communism can be checked without resort to force by constructive changes at home and, in the case of the French, in colonial areas.

In Italy the government of Premier Amintore Fanfani—who as

(Continued on page 39)



## Debate on China Continues

**Views of**  
**Frank Altschul, Stanley K. Hornbeck,**  
**Thomas K. Finletter and Thomas E. Dewey**

*The agreement reached by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek on Formosa on October 22 linked the defense of the offshore islands of Quemoy and Matsu with the defense of Formosa; expressed hope for the peaceful liberation of the Communist-held mainland of China; and contained a statement in which the Chinese Nationalists renounced the use of force as the principal means of returning to the mainland.*

*During the three months since the Chinese Communists first started shelling Quemoy and Matsu, a number of leading Americans have commented on the situation in the Formosa Strait, and have made suggestions concerning its possible settlement. The October 15 issue of the Foreign Policy Bulletin carried statements by John Foster Dulles and Dean Acheson.*

*For another presentation of two opposing views see Headline Series, No. 129, "Should the U.S. Change Its China Policy?" by Eustace Seligman and Richard L. Walker.—Editor.*

*Frank Altschul, chairman, Committee on International Policy, National Planning Association, as excerpted from his letter to the editor of The New York Times of September 14:*

When the President of the United States, faced with a critical decision, addresses the American people on an issue of the utmost seriousness, his words are entitled to the sober consideration of every citizen. It is in this spirit that I listened to him and it is in this spirit that I have

read and reread his radio address on the Far Eastern situation.

No one will quarrel with the President's expressed desire to seek by peaceful means a negotiated solution of the problem confronting us in the Taiwan Strait, although it is a little difficult to see how this is to be done short of "any arrangements which would prejudice" what Chiang Kai-shek conceives to be the "rights of our ally, the Republic of China."

### What Is Aggression?

Here, admittedly, persuasion might play an important role. But what I should think many Americans would feel was open to serious question is the decision apparently reached to use, should negotiations fail, the armed forces of the United States in the defense of Quemoy and Matsu under the authority granted in the joint resolution of Congress adopted in January 1955.

To justify this position, the President invokes "the principle that armed force shall not be used for aggressive purposes." Quite apart from the fact that this principle if religiously adhered to must put an end to any illusory hopes that Chiang Kai-shek would ever return to the mainland, is the principle invoked properly applicable in the case of Quemoy and Matsu?

Can an attempt to liberate from an occupying force two islands immediately adjacent to mainland China, of which they have always been a part, fairly be termed "aggression" in the generally accepted meaning of that word?

The President argues forcibly against the "appeasement" of "ruthless despots," the futility of which has so often been experienced. And he draws upon the history of the Munich surrender and its consequences to support his view. But is there any real analogy between Czechoslovakia and Quemoy?

In the case of the former a free, independent and sovereign state was sacrificed by the very nations which had treaty obligations to protect it. This was a classic example both of appeasement and of its failure. But could the eventual yielding to the government of mainland China of Quemoy and Matsu, which—until and unless the President assumes such an obligation—we have no commitment to defend, be considered a remotely comparable case?

The President envisages the most devastating consequences should "the Chinese Communists conquer Quemoy." Formosa would be next in line of fire and in the end "all of the free world positions in the western Pacific area" would be liquidated and brought "under captive governments which would be hostile to the United States and to the free world."

### Obligation for Formosa

But does this of necessity follow? We have a treaty obligation to defend Formosa and here we stand not only on good legal, but on good moral, ground as well. Formosa has not since 1895 been under the control of a Chinese government and it has never been a part of Communist China.

Its defense would enlist broad

sympathy and wide support throughout the world, both of which have been and seem likely to continue to be strikingly absent in respect to Quemoy.

*Stanley K. Hornbeck, formerly director of the State Department's Office of Far Eastern Affairs and United States ambassador to The Netherlands, as excerpted from a letter to the editor of The New York Times of September 21 in answer to the above letter from Mr. Altshul:*

The Communist leaders who acquired control of the mainland of China in 1949 have repeatedly declared it their intention to complete their conquest of China and bring under their control all parts and all people of that country.

Toward that end the Communists now are making an armed attack upon coastal islands that are a part of the domain retained by the National government when in 1949 that government withdrew from the mainland.

The United States has long been opposing use of armed force for purposes other than those of self-defense.

The United States, having in 1928 recognized the National government as the government of the Republic of China, has continuously so recognized that government and in 1955 entered into a treaty with it for purposes of "mutual defense."

The government of the United States considers the present armed attack from the mainland upon the Quemoy and the Matsu islands an act of Communist aggression.

To say that the islands now under attack "have always been a part of mainland China" is to confuse a fact of geography with facts of history and of jurisdiction. Location and jurisdiction (or right thereto) usually are, but in many cases are not,

coincidental: For instances, the island of Hong Kong and the island of Macao. The Quemoys and the Matsus, though they are geographically parts of mainland China, have at no time been parts of the domain of the government (the government of the People's Republic) which has since 1949 exercised jurisdiction on the mainland.

### **U.S. Policy—What and Why**

The issue, however, on which our government has taken its stand is not that of protecting two islands: it is that of conquest by use of armed force. The principle on which the Eisenhower Administration is acting is identical with that to which President Truman gave utterance when in 1947 he declared: "I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or outside pressures."

The Quemoys and the Matsus have been and are, along with Formosa and the Pescadores, parts of the domain of Nationalist China. That domain is a domain of a "free" people, a people resisting attempted subjugation by outside pressures. The struggle between the Communists and the Nationalists in China has been and is far more than a "civil conflict." As it was in Korea and was in Vietnam, so it is in China: It is not alone local Communist forces that are engaged in aggression, it is local Communist forces plus the Soviet Union and the Communist world in general.

In relations with any part of the Communist world no country can without risk pursue a policy of resistance to Communist pressures. The Communists always exert their pressures at points where they think the free world is weak. The free world is confronted time after time

with the alternatives of resisting or of yielding, bit by bit, here and there, in one context or another.

At this moment the focal point of Communist pressure by armed force happens to be, by choice of the Communists, the islands offshore to mainland China. But the focal point of the American government's concern is that this is another testing of the will and the ability of the free world to resist.

Is it not then rather easily deducible that in making "in the present circumstances" the choice which it has made, the United States government is acting not "to protect two small islands," but in pursuance of a major policy to which this country has long been committed, that of contending for peace and security by opposing and resisting armed aggression? Is it not taking only those risks that are constantly inherent in pursuit of that policy? Is it not rejecting counsels of appeasement in the belief that acts of appeasement have profited, historically, only the aggressors in whose favor they have been made?

*Thomas K. Finletter, Secretary of the Air Force, 1950-53, and chairman of the President's Air Policy Commission under President Truman, as excerpted from a letter to the editor of The New York Times of September 8:*

To say that the defense of Quemoy and Matsu is necessary to the defense of the United States is nonsense. Listen to what General Matthew B. Ridgway has to say about their strategic importance:

"Quemoy and Matsu were two small islands, occupied by our friends, the Nationalist Chinese. They lay within artillery range of the Red Chinese on the mainland. They constituted, to my way of thinking, no more than listening

posts on an outpost line of observation. They had little value as offensive bases. . . . To go to war for Quemoy or Matsu to me would seem an unwarranted and tragic course to take." (*Soldier*, Harpers, 1956, pp. 278-9.)

The truth is that the defense of these islands is necessary only for the defense of an untenable United States diplomatic position brought about by concessions to a small, vociferous minority in this country.

We should now do what we should have done long ago, which is to stop the present unilateral assumption of power and responsibility by the United States with respect to the whole Formosa group of islands. We should instead turn over the entire problem—both of the temporary defense of the *status quo* and the need for a prompt decision as to the ultimate ownership of the islands—to the United Nations for decision.

It has long been evident that this is the only proper United States foreign policy for these islands. It is doubly evident now that we should move immediately to put this policy into effect.

The imminent danger of disastrous war makes it imperative that the President of the United States act without delay to choose this, the road toward peace, rather than the present dangerous downhill rush toward a war in which the United States, with no support from its allies or from world opinion, would stand alone against the two great Communist empires.

*Thomas E. Dewey, former governor of New York, as excerpted from CBS-TV's "Small World," produced by Edward R. Murrow and Fred W. Friendly, on October 12:*

Dewey: I think the World Court is the proper place to determine whose real estate those little islands

are, and if the Communists won't agree to the World Court, then the United Nations could ask for an advisory opinion, and I am sure that the United States would abide by the World Court, and I can't imagine that the Nationalists on Formosa would refuse to abide by it. It may well be that those islands are properly part of the mainland, and if so, the World Court, I am sure, would say so, and I am sure we would abide by it.

Nehru: It's a very odd situation. The People's government of China on the mainland is not recognized by the United Nations. If it is not

recognized, how can you ask them to recognize any organ of the United Nations? One can't have it both ways. Either they must have a place in the United Nations, or else they will simply ignore the United Nations, as they have been doing.

Dewey: The United Nations can, by resolution, call on the World Court for an advisory opinion as to who owns the offshore islands; whether they are part of continental China, or whether they are an island. . . .

Nehru: I don't think that is a method which would lead to any result.

## Spotlight

(Continued from page 36)

political secretary of the Christian Democratic party since 1954 had shown increasing awareness of the need for economic and social improvement, particularly in the backward South, which has often been described as an underdeveloped area,—has succeeded in maintaining an effective middle-of-the-road regime and has sought to improve relations between the West and Egypt. The election on October 28 of Pope John XXIII, known for his belief that if the Church is to survive, it must be the Church of the poor, also emphasizes concern with social welfare.

### Dramatic Change in France

The most dramatic change, however, has taken place in France, only last May torn by internal strife which, some observers predicted, would play into the hands of the Communists. Although the Communist party, which numbers some 50,000 hard-core militants but in recent elections had garnered 5,000,000 votes, or one-quarter of the total ballots cast, vigorously opposed General Charles de Gaulle, accusing him of being a fascist, it is estimated that

about 1 million Communist supporters broke ranks on September 28 and voted "yes" in the referendum. It remains to be seen how the Communists will vote in the elections of November 23 and 30, to be held under the new electoral system which is expected to favor the moderate parties. In any case, under the constitution of the Fifth Republic it may be possible for the government to demand that the Communist party should forswear its ties to Moscow on threat of dissolution.

The success of de Gaulle, however, is due not to repression but to the fact that, for the first time in many years those who want changes in economic, social and colonial policies can hope to obtain them through means other than Communist opposition to non-Communist governments. The emphasis placed by de Gaulle on the need for better housing, improved living conditions, greater participation by workers in the life of the nation, a settlement in Algeria which would permit voting even by supporters of independence, and independence for African trust territories, such as the Cameroons and French Togoland, have all opened new vistas to French voters.

By repudiating and easily defeating the resistance of the military and of antigovernment committees in Algeria General de Gaulle has resoundingly answered those who accused him of fascism, and has gained the support of once-critical moderates. He has thus cleared the way for resumption of France's traditional trend, *toujours à la gauche* (always to the left), which since 1919 had been blocked by the Communists. Meanwhile, his invitation to France's African colonies, to make their own choice between immediate independence or association with France in a new Community, with the possibility of attaining eventual independence, has won the admiration of uncommitted countries like India, which had previously been critical of France's actions in Indochina and Algeria.

This does not mean that the appeal of communism is at an end. It can be expected to remain strong in the still underdeveloped countries of Asia, the Middle East, Africa and Latin America, although even there nationalism often acts as a restraining force on Communist aspirations, as has been shown in India, Indonesia and Egypt. There, too, however, the antidote is not an emphasis on militarization and the suppression of Communists, but the acceleration of efforts to carry out economic and social reforms in the hope

of stabilizing societies in ferment. Even Chiang Kai-shek, who had dreamed of returning to the China mainland with the military backing of the United States, solemnly declared in the communiqué of October 23 on his conversations with Secretary of State John Foster Dulles that the hope of restoring freedom

on the mainland rests "in the minds and the hearts of the Chinese people." The principal means of successfully achieving his mission, he said, is not the use of force, but the implementation of Dr. Sun Yat-sen's three principles—nationalism, democracy and social well-being.

VERA MICHELES DEAN



## FPA Bookshelf

### INDIA

*The New India: Progress through Democracy* (New York, Macmillan, 1958, cloth ed., \$5.00, paper ed., \$2.50), prepared by a study group set up by the Planning Commission of the Indian government and written by Jean Joyce, executive associate of the Ford Foundation in India, is a useful summary of the objectives and achievements of the country's first and second Five-Year plans, crammed with facts and figures which are often difficult to obtain.

In *The Heart of India* (New York, Knopf, 1958, \$5.00), Alexander Campbell, former correspondent of *Time* and *Life* in India, sets out to look for the worst features of the country and has no trouble finding them, although he keeps on saying that he wants to see the good as well. By way of a contrast, Taya Zinkin, *Manchester Guardian* correspondent and long-time resident of India, whose husband, also a writer, is with Lever Brothers there, while not mincing words about India's problems, looks with hope to its future in *India Changes!* (New York, Oxford University Press, 1958, \$5.00).

### AFRICA

In *The Politics of Inequality: South Africa since 1948* (New York, Praeger, 1958, \$7.50), Gwendolen M. Carter of the Department of Government at Smith College

gives a comprehensive, objective and carefully documented picture of developments in a country where the political desire for *apartheid* of the white man from the people of color contends for influence with national economic interests.

*South African Winter* (New York, Pantheon, 1958, \$3.75), by James Morris is one of the most objective, as well as lively and colorful, books ever written about this tormented country. As correspondent for the *Manchester Guardian*, the author spent the winter of 1957 there, traveling widely and talking to people of all races.

### THE POLAR REGIONS

*Quest for a Continent* (New York, McGraw, 1957, \$5.50) is the story of Antarctica, the coldest continent on earth and almost as large as Europe and Australia combined. Walter Sullivan, *The New York Times* correspondent, writes this gripping story on the basis of first-hand information, having been attached to three United States polar expeditions.

The other side of the world is described in great detail by the late distinguished Danish explorer, Peter Freuchen, and by Dr. Finn Salomonsen of the Universitetets Zoologiske Museum in Copenhagen in their book, *The Arctic Year* (New York, Putnam, 1958, \$5.95). Both books make exciting reading about two little-known continents, which are of great strategic importance.

## FOREIGN POLICY BULLETIN

345 East 46th Street, New York 17, N. Y.

### In this issue:

Arab Nationalism and Nasser—G. Kirk.....	33
Foreign Policy and the Election—N. Stanford.....	35
How to Check Communism—V. M. Dean.....	36
Debate on China Continues.....	37
FPA Bookshelf .....	40

### In the next issue:

A Foreign Policy Report—

Will the Common Market Succeed?

by Jan Hasbrouck

MR. PAUL MANLEY  
17917. SCHENELY AVE.  
CLEVELAND 19, OHIO

PBM-3